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Directorate of Intelligence



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Terrorism Review

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28 April 1983

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GI TR 83-009 28 April 1983

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Black June Organization: Current Status	25X1
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The recent assassination of PLO moderate Issam	The relationship between Arafat and Syria was erod-
Sartawi, claimed by Abu Nidal's Damascus office, may be the beginning of a new wave of Syrian-backed Black June attacks.	ing at that time,
	Abu Nidal was reported
	to be back in Iraq in 1982 but maintained his office in Damascus. Abu Nidal's reported return to Syria may
	be a repeat performance of his earlier shift, and
	represents his uncanny ability to move from one patron to the other, yet maintain some degree of
	support from both. 25X1
	In addition to possible attacks on PLO and Israeli
	targets, future Black June operations may also in-
	clude attacks in retaliation for the imprisonment of
	BJO members in Kuwait and Spain.
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Abu Nidal has been driven by a desire to destroy	20/(1
Arafat and the moderate PLO since 1974, when he	25X1
formed his group in Baghdad under Iraqi patronage. His attacks were directed solely at PLO representa-	
tives and moderate Arabs until 1978 when Iraq began	
clamping down on his activities following Baghdad's rapprochement with the PLO. In return for Syrian	
support, Abu Nidal in 1980-81 began carrying out	
attacks from Damascus. Some of these attacks coin-	•
cided with Syrian interests and included PLO targets.	

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Terrorist Attacks Against	
the US Military, 1968-82 ¹	

US military personnel and facilities abroad have been and will almost certainly continue to be significant targets of international terrorist activities:

- They are widely regarded by terrorists as symbols of imperialism and neocolonialism.
- They are highly visible and, in many cases, easily accessible to terrorists.

On the afternoon of 2 July 1982 in Frankfurt, West Germany, a time bomb exploded outside the building housing the US Army 5th Corps Headquarters. The explosion caused no injuries and only slight material damage. Local police determined that the bomb had been concealed in a saddlebag attached to a bicycle, which had been placed against the fence surrounding two communications vans. In a confessor letter to the German Press Agency, the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), a leftwing German terrorist group, claimed responsibility, stating that the United States was "directly responsible" for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In its nature and result, this incident is similar to many other terrorist attacks that have been directed against US military personnel and facilities over the past 15 years: it occurred in Western Europe, was perpetrated by indigenous leftwing terrorists, involved explosives, and caused no casualties.

Although the number of events has fluctuated from year to year, an overview of the 557 recorded international terrorist incidents directed against the US military between January 1968 and December 1982 reveals a steady upward trend from a low of six incidents in 1968 to a high of 75 in 1982. Peak years of 1971 (44 incidents) and 1976 (61 incidents) resulted from short-term growth in anti-American terrorist activity in a few West European countries where the US military maintains a large presence: Turkey and Greece in 1971; Italy, Greece, and West Germany in

1976; and West Germany in 1982. Although US military personnel and facilities in 50 countries were attacked by terrorists during the past 15 years, more than two-thirds of the incidents occurred in these four countries:

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- In West Germany—the largest US military presence outside the United States—leftwing terrorists frequently attack large US military facilities. Four US servicemen have been killed and 43 wounded in these attacks—more than in any other country. Three bombings by the Red Army Faction (RAF) and one by the RZ accounted for 40 of these casualties.
- Turkey was the site of eight outright assassination attempts against US military personnel—more than any other country in Europe—in which five American servicemen were killed and three wounded. We believe that anti-American targeting by leftwing terrorist groups has been an extension of the domestic political violence that has plagued Turkey in recent years.
- According to our records, no US servicemen have been killed by terrorists in Greece or Italy. Terrorists in these countries have generally confined their attacks against the US military to late night fire-bombings of unoccupied private vehicles. A notable exception was the kidnaping by the Red Brigades of Brigadier General Dozier in December 1981.

Since January 1968, international terrorists have employed a wide range of threatened or actual violence against US military personnel and facilities. Bombings were the most common type of attack, accounting for more than 65 percent of all recorded incidents. As a tactic, bombings offer terrorists several advantages

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International Terrorist Incidents Directed Against the US Military, January 1968-December 1982

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Total
Kidnaping	0	1	3	3	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	14
Bombing a	4	12	22	33	20	22	9	12	49	46	33	15	18	24	47	366
Assassination a	2	1	4	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	4	3	7	3	30
Armed attack/ sniping	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	5	7	0	2	2	23
Theft/break-in	0	0	5	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	2	16
Threat/hoax	0	0	4	5	3	3	3	6	7	7	5	4	3	8	18	76
Other b	0	0	3	1	1	1	1	3	3	1	3	2	5	5	3	32
Total	6	14	43	44	25	29	18	26	61	54	47	34	29	52	75	557

a Includes attempts.

over other forms of attack: explosives are relatively easy to obtain; devices are not difficult to construct; explosions can be timed so as to pose little risk to the perpetrators; and bombings are the simplest way to destroy property, which is often the terrorist's specific goal.

Most of the terrorist incidents we have recorded in the past 15 years did not result in casualties. Attacks against the US military were no exception. Less than 10 percent of our recorded attacks against US military personnel and facilities resulted in death or personal injury—29 servicemen killed and 75 wounded. More than 58 percent of the attacks resulting in casualties were direct assassination attempts.

Specific terrorist groups claimed responsibility for only about a third of the total number of terrorist incidents directed against US military personnel and facilities since January 1968. Of those claiming credit, the following groups were responsible for the most attacks: the RAF and the RZ in West Germany, the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA—an umbrella organization comprising as many as 15 subgroups) in Greece, and the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) in Turkey.

The 75 recorded terrorist incidents directed against US military personnel or facilities in 1982 (an increase of 44 percent over 1981) resulted in one person killed and two wounded. These incidents included 47 bombings and three assassination attempts. Although the events took place in 14 different countries, nearly two-thirds occurred in West Germany, where US targets are most numerous and where extreme leftist and anarchistic elements are increasingly anti-American in outlook. In Italy and Greece, terrorist activity against the US military increased only slightly in 1982, continuing the pattern of low-level violence established during the past 15 years. In Turkey, where the government of Gen. Kenan Evren has been cracking down on terrorism since late 1980, there were no major terrorist incidents involving US military personnel or facilities in 1982.

Outlook

In those countries where terrorist attacks against US military personnel and facilities have been most prevalent, the outlook is as follows:

 West Germany—Despite recent counterterrorist successes by West German authorities, we believe

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^b Includes hijacking, sabotage, shootout with police, conspiracy.

the threat to US military personnel and facilities remains significant. The projected deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in the fall of 1983 has intensified anti-US sentiment in West Germany and could stimulate acts of terrorism against US military targets. Among the groups likely to exploit the INF issue is the RZ, which has tended to link its activities to matters of concern to a broad spectrum of the German populace.

- Turkey—Assuming continuation of General Evren's massive counterterrorist effort which has decimated leftwing terrorism, we expect the threat to US military personnel and facilities to remain minimal.
- Italy—We perceive no indication that terrorist activity directed against the US military will deviate from its past pattern of random attacks on property.

• Greece—ELA has publicly threatened to attack American property if US basing rights currently under negotiation are renewed.

lieve this threat should be taken seriously.

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
Group Profile:				25X1
PFLP-SC				25X1
				25 X 1
				25 X 1
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC) has mounted only a few major terrorist operations since it was formed in 1979, avoiding actions against Israel as difficult and dangerous.	Chronology	of PFLP-SC	Operations	25X1 25X1
All of the PFLP-SC's operations thus far have been		City	Event	25 X 1
bombings, which utilized timed devices.	1981			
the PFLP-SC has access to a	20 October	Antwerp	Van exploded outs	side synagogue
range of small arms and automatic weapons. Major		· •	in diamond distric	
PFLP-SC operations have been conducted against	1980			
Jewish targets in Paris, Antwerp, and Nairobi.	31 December	Nairobi	Bombing of Norfo	ZJA
	3 October	Paris	Explosions at syna	
				25)
and members of the PFLP-SC were able to escape Beirut, many members going to Sofia, Bulgaria.	groups work Palestinian believe the I with such te	dwide. It reje issue and pro PFLP-SC ma rrorist group	act with other rad octs a political solu motes armed strug y have retained old s as the Red Army and and Liberty (E	tion to the ggle. We I SOG links
The group was formed in early 1979 from remnants of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-				25%
Special Operations Group (PFLP-SOG), which broke up in 1978 following the death of its leader Wadi Haddad. After Haddad's death, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) leader George Habbash demanded that PFLP-SOG members be assigned throughout the PFLP. While some SOG members returned to the PFLP and others were recruited by Fatah, the majority refused on grounds that the SOG had millions of dollars amassed from various terrorist operations and that they did not wish to turn this money over to the PFLP. In early 1979, Abu Ibrahim formed the 15 May Organization with a number of former SOG members, and the remaining SOG members organized the PFLP-SC.	would be res financial and The PFLP-S Palestinian	adi Haddad ay be backed sponsive to ar d logistic sup SC is headed	by Salim Abu Sal nese citizenship. S	ieve the SC viding 25X im, a
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Special Analysis	
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Iran: Tehran's Terrorist Campaign	25X1
	25X1
Iranian covert activities in Lebanon are only part of Tehran's campaign to promote political instability throughout the Middle East. Iran's ruling clerics	thetic to Iranian interests. They also are designed to reduce superpower influence in the Middle East.
believe it is their religious duty to foster Islamic governments along Iranian lines. The United States, Israel, and moderate Arab states are viewed as threats to the achievement of this goal. Although there is a wide variation in views among Iranian leaders on how aggressively to pursue their goals, the perceived success of Iran's attacks will probably strengthen the position of those in the regime who advocate the use of terrorism and subversion.	Iranian Presence in Lebanon Iranian subversive activities in Lebanon are aided by sectarian violence and the presence of pro-Iranian Shia groups. The Iranians also can pick from a variety of targets, including US, Israeli, and West European troops and installations. Iran maintains several hundred Revolutionary Guards in the Syrian-controlled sector of Lebanon. They are involved in propaganda activity and the recruitment of Lebanese Shias for training in Iran.
Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholeslam, who played a leading role in the taking of the hostages at the US Embassy, and Deputy Foreign Minister Mansuri, a former Revolutionary Guard leader, are active in promoting subversive activities. Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Khomeini's apparent heir, and his supporters in the Revolutionary Guard also are advocates of subversion.	The Guard is closely allied with two breakaway factions of Amal, Lebanon's mainline Shia organization. The larger group, which has a few hundred men, is under the command of Husayn Musawi. It also has ties with Syria. A less well-known group, probably 25X numbering under 100, is headed by Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadallah. It operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
President Khamenei, Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, and other conservative senior officials often go along with aggressive policies. They use the subversive activities of independent clerics outside the government to intimidate other regimes in the Persian Gulf region. Foreign Minister Velayati and former Prime	this group may have kidnaped American University President Dodge last summer at Iranian behest. This was most likely done in retaliation for the kidnaping and probable murder of four Iranian Em- bassy officials in Lebanon by unknown elements in July 1982. 25X
Minister Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, however, generally favor nonviolent methods of exporting the Iranian revolution.	we believe that the Islamic Struggle Organization, the first group to 25X1
Tehran's subversive actions are most likely to be used to protect Iran's own revolution and to foster the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist regimes sympa-	claim credit for the blast, is probably an Iranian- supported Shia group. The car bomb devastated the center section of the seven-story Embassy leaving at

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least 40 dead and over 100 injured. Of the dead, at least 17 were Americans.	Gulf countries. The training is directed by Revolutionary Guards and is said to include instruction in assassination and sabotage, paramilitary training, and	25X1
Although the Iranian Government has denied any involvement with the group, a caller to a Beirut newspaper said the Islamic Struggle Organization had bombed the Embassy as "part of the Iranian revolution's campaign against imperialist targets." The same group claimed credit last month for the attack on the US Marines assigned to the multinational peacekeeping force, and this month for the attacks on the French and Italian contingents of the MNF. Past Embassy Beirut reporting indicates that the Iranians, through their Lebanese Shia allies, were involved in the attacks on the MNF.	ideological and religious instruction.	•
Actions Against Iraq The Iranians also have carried out numerous acts of terrorism against Iraqi targets. Iranian-backed Shia dissidents, for example, have claimed responsibility for five car bombings over the last year against Iraqi installations: • Last August a car carrying explosives blew up in front of the Iraqi Embassy in Paris. • In the same month a car filled with explosives was driven by a Shia terrorist team into the Ministry of Planning in Baghdad, killing at least 50 people. • In December a car bomb outside the Iraqi News Agency building in Baghdad killed several bystanders. • On 21 April two car bombings in Baghdad inflicted heavy damage to a hotel and the Air Force head-quarters.	Tehran has numerous assets within Pakistan for covert activities, including Iranian students of the Iranian Students Islamic Association and Revolutionary Guard personnel attached to the Iranian Embassy in Islamabad. Several Iranian students organized and encouraged by the Iranian Consul General and members of his staff reportedly were involved in the bombing of French facilities in Karachi this year. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia dissidents also claimed credit for these attacks. The Iranian diplomats also played a prominent role in encouraging the Shia sit-in that has led to sectarian fighting in Karachi. The Iranian Consul General subsequently was expelled.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
Actions Against Other Countries Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region, Iran is working hard to undermine the Government of Bahrain. For example, the Iranians are providing assistance to two major fundamentalist dissident groups there. One attempted a coup in December 1981 after receiving extensive training, financing, and equipment from Iran.		25X1
Iran runs training camps near Tehran and Isfahan for dissidents from Persian		25X1

South Africa: ANC Terrorist Operations, 1981-83	25X1
•	25 X 1

The 88 terrorist operations the African National Congress (ANC) has mounted within South Africa since 1981 generally conform to a set pattern. The targets, their locations, and the timing and methods of the operations strongly suggest that political and propaganda objectives dominate ANC operational planning. The ANC leadership, in our view, realizes that its organization is not yet capable of conducting a regime-threatening military campaign. It carries out operations primarily to garner support among South African blacks and to remind the white regime that the ANC is a force to be reckoned with.

The 1981-82 Operational Pattern

Targets and Their Locations. Of the ANC's 78 attacks during 1981-82, 70 were against three types of targets:

- Energy and transportation infrastructure: 40 attacks (railway lines, trains, and stations—16; power stations, lines, and switches—12; other miscellaneous targets in this category—12).
- Government administration buildings and courts: 16 attacks.
- Security facilities: 14 attacks (police stations and personnel—10; army facilities and personnel—4).

The selection of targets was clearly driven by political and propaganda considerations. The attack on the synthetic fuel plant in 1981, the sabotage of the Koeberg nuclear reactors in 1982, as well as the attacks on other economic targets, were intended to embarrass the government and to demonstrate to whites and blacks alike that the ANC has the capability to strike at will.

Annual operational totals: 15	981—47; 1982—31; 1983—10, to
date.	

The attacks on government and security installations had a more obvious political message. Most of the government buildings bombed were involved in some aspect of black administration, especially the system of pass laws designed to control the influx of blacks from the homelands. Many of the attacks on transportation facilities were aimed at disrupting the flow of workers from the black townships to white urban centers. Almost all of the attacks on police stations occurred in the homelands or black townships. These operations were designed to intimidate black security personnel, whom the ANC harangues for being "apartheid collaborators."

The majority of operations were conducted in the most populated urban areas probably because media coverage is guaranteed there, preferred targets are bountiful, urban blacks are more politicized than blacks elsewhere in South Africa, and support for the ANC among urban blacks is substantial. The ANC conducted 51 of 78 operations in 1981-82 in the cities of Johannesburg, Durban, East London, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and their adjoining townships. The 25X1 remainder were scattered throughout more isolated areas of South Africa and in the black homelands.

Timing. The ANC also chooses most of the dates for its attacks to enhance their political impact. In 1981 and 1982, most operations—51 of 78—were in reaction to a recent event, or were conducted just prior to or on an ANC "historical anniversary" or a white holiday:


• Twenty-five incidents occurred in the months of May and June. Important dates in these months include: 31 May—Republic Day (Anniversary of

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the Founding of the Republic of South Africa); 16 June—Anniversary of the Soweto Riots; and 26 June—Anniversary of the Establishment of the ANC's Freedom Charter (the ANC's "Declaration of Independence").

 Seven operations were conducted on 25 May 1981—the most ANC operations ever on a single day. The ANC had called for a work boycott on that date to counter celebrations planned for the 20th anniversary of the Republic on 31 May.

The ANC plainly chooses most of its operational dates in this manner to embellish its image as the leading black opposition group. Operations that take place in proximity to white holidays are intended to emphasize the historical plight of blacks as the victims of white—particularly Afrikaner—progress. Attacks are staged on ANC commemorative dates and significant black anniversaries to establish and publicize a national identity and history that are different from those of whites. The ANC has also exploited the symbolic importance of anniversary dates in other ways. It chose 16 December (1961) to found its military wing—"The Spear of the Nation"—because it coincides with the Afrikaner holiday, the Day of the Covenant (the Anniversary of the Battle of Blood River in 1838 in which a greatly outnumbered group of Afrikaner "trekkers" defeated Zulu warriors).

Casualties. The relatively low rate of casualties from ANC operations lends credibility to the ANC's claim that it carefully plans its operations to minimize civilian casualties:

- In 1981 the ANC injured 25 civilians and killed two. Most of the injured were cut by flying glass in bomb explosions. One of the fatalities resulted from a bombing—the victim might have been the bomber, according to police reports—the other occurred during an attack on a police station.
- In 1982 only three civilians were injured and three killed. Two of the fatalities were assassination targets—a former ANC member labeled "traitor" and his wife—the third was unintentionally killed in the bombing of an elevator shaft.

•	In 1981-82, 14 sec	curity person	nnel were	injured,	and
	seven were killed.				

Bombings accounted for 62 of the 78 incidents during 1981-82, and the ratio of nighttime to daylight bombings was about 7 to 1. Most bombs went off in the late evening or early morning in unoccupied buildings or on isolated railways. Daylight bombings often occurred only minutes before a crowd was expected or after a train had passed. The pattern of these "close calls" suggests they are intentional and designed to increase media coverage.

One of the most spectacular near misses, however, apparently involved an operational error as well. On 19 June 1982 a bomb exploded underneath a train carrying 350 passengers—almost all blacks—in the eastern Transvaal, just before it was to cross a river. The passenger train was apparently not the intended target. An ANC attorney claims that the operations team used an outdated timetable and was horrified when a passenger train loaded with blacks detonated the bomb instead of an expected freight train. The small size and specific placement of the bomb, moreover, suggest that the operation's planners did not intend to derail a train into the river.

The 1983 Bloemfontein Explosion

The bombing on 18 February of the Bantu Administration Board Building in Bloemfontein that killed one black and injured some 75 others—the most casualties ever in a South African terrorist incident—also reportedly involved an ANC operational error. The target was consistent with the ANC's pattern, but the timing was not; some 300 blacks were in the building, most of them jobseekers lined up some 30 meters from the bathroom where the bomb exploded during morning office hours.

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ing office hours.			

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Geographic Pattern of ANC Operations in 1983

The geographic pattern of ANC operations so far this year appears to us to reflect an effort by ANC leaders to offset the psychological impact of the South African Defense Force raid on ANC facilities in Maseru, Lesotho, last December. Eight of the 10 incidents to date this year occurred within 150 kilometers of Lesotho. Four of these were located in the nearby Orange Free State where only one small operation had been conducted in the previous two years. The key urban areas traditionally targeted (Durban, Soweto, Johannesburg) have thus far been ignored.

Similarly, the ANC, in our view, has probably concentrated on attacking the Bloemfontein area to spite Pretoria. During the raid on Maseru, the South African military captured ANC plans for a strike against the Bloemfontein railway station, according to press reports. Despite this publicity, the ANC carried out operations against railway targets near Bloemfontein in January and March of this year.

White Targets

Several times in past years—most recently following the raid on Maseru—the ANC has publicly threatened to begin targeting white civilians, but no such strategy has yet been implemented. Casualty figures since 1981 suggest that the ANC continues to avoid harming whites: only one white was killed and 16 injured, compared to 14 nonwhite fatalities and 112 injuries.

We believe that the ANC has been reluctant to target white civilians primarily because of the potentially devastating effects of the likely response by Pretoria. Should the ANC begin a program of attacking white civilians, Pretoria would probably institute more stringent and repressive internal security measures that would fall heavily on South African blacks and make it more difficult for the ANC to operate within South Africa. The ANC leadership probably realizes its support among blacks would be undercut if the group was responsible for triggering a harsh reaction from Pretoria. Moreover, Pretoria, would be likely to respond with cross-border raids against ANC members and facilities throughout southern Africa, making an ANC presence even more of a liability to these countries.

In following this policy, the ANC leadership—made up in part by white, pro-Soviet South African Communist Party members—has apparently had to restrain young black militants who joined the ANC after the Soweto riots in 1976. These militants resent the leadership of whites and argue that white civilian targets should be hit.

New Development

In a new and ambitious development, a few operational teams appear to have remained within the black townships and possibly within the homelands, for months at a time. Traditionally, ANC terrorists have exfiltrated South Africa immediately after completing their operation against a preplanned target. A press report in January 1982 stated that South African police had found an ANC underground facility north of Pretoria containing weapons, explosives, food, medicines, and other supplies. Moreover, a steady stream of ANC bombings in Durban in 1981 ended in December of that year following the arrests of a group of suspected ANC guerrillas in Durban. The group was implicated in seven Durban bombings that occurred over a nine-month period in 1981. The roundup was followed by a five-month hiatus on bombings in the Durban area.

Outlook

We believe that the ANC is likely to depart from its present pattern of striking targets in the vicinity of Lesotho and will focus once again on major urban areas in May and June. The number of incidents to date suggests 1983 will be a particularly active year for the group.

Pretoria's cross-border raids, however, have led to a cooling trend in ANC relations with several states in the region whose territories are used by the group. If this trend continues, the ANC will face considerable obstacles to increasing its number of operations. It may be forced to conduct fewer operations and may

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
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compensate by trying to pull off more "spectaculars." Moreover, the ANC leadership may also calculate that their bombings of empty government buildings and isolated electrical substations has become commonplace and of decreasing propaganda value.	25X1
Although we do not expect the ANC to adopt a new policy of targeting white civilians in the foreseeable future, radical members could begin a renegade campaign of killing white civilians at any time.	25X′
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Statistical Overview

International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-83^a



^a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.

^bBreak-ins, conspiracy, shoot-out, etc.

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	This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications.	
2 and 7 April 1983	Sri Lanka: Tamil Terrorists Protest Prevention of Terrorism Act Two explosions in government buildings indicate the stepped-up efforts of Tamil terrorists to disrupt civil activity and demonstrate their power in an attempt to prevent the passage of the government's prevention of terrorism act.	
8 April 1983	Lebanon: Car Bomb Against Iranian Revolutionary Guard A car bomb exploded in front of the headquarters of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, killing two and wounding 18. It was the second attack against the building, although the bombing on 26 March did not result in any injuries. No one has claimed responsibility for either incident. 25X1 Colombia: US Citizen Kidnaped Several men dressed in police-type uniforms kidnaped US citizen Catherine Kirby from her ranch in central Colombia. The kidnapers gave no indication of affiliation with any organized terrorist group and have as yet made no attempt to contact the family with demands. 25X1 Pakistan: Explosion at PACC A bomb exploded at the Pakistani-American Cultural Center. No one has claimed responsibility and there were no injuries.	
9 April 1983	Corsica: Anti-French Bombings In Ajaccio, 10 bombs exploded, damaging French-owned property but causing no injuries. Although no group has yet claimed credit for the attacks, we believe the Corsican National Liberation Front was probably responsible.	

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core RAF terrorists in December 1982.

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13 April 1983

Greece: Explosion Injures Two Saudi Embassy Personnel

In Athens, a Saudi diplomat and his driver were injured when a car bomb exploded as two cars from the Saudi Embassy drove past. Greek police believe the Saudi Ambassador was the target of the attack, although he was not in either car at the time. A previously unknown group, Revolutionary and Popular Solidarity, claimed credit for the attack, accusing the Saudi Government of complicity with the United States in anti-Palestinian policies.

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Guatemala: Terrorists Attack Presidential Guards

Security forces captured two members of the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), one of whom admitted to have participated in the 12 April attack against the Presidential Guard that killed two and wounded 14.

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14 April 1983

Spain: More Basque Terrorism

In Mondragon, a bomb exploded in a car killing two people and wounding two others. On the basis of weapons found in the car, authorities believe the four people were Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorists and may have planted a time bomb that exploded 20 minutes later at a nearby bank. Financial institutions refusing to pay ETA "revolutionary taxes" have been a favorite target of the Basque terrorists.

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Colombia: Honduran Consul Attacked

Three persons who entered the Honduran Consulate under the pretense of applying for visas bound the consul to his chair and placed a small quantity of dynamite in his desk. The resulting explosion caused considerable damage and injured both the consul and his secretary, who had been locked in an adjoining room. Before leaving, the group spray painted anti-Honduran slogans on the walls and claimed responsibility in the name of the M-19.

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15 April 1983

Italy: Terrorist Group Declared "Dead"

In Bologna, imprisoned Prima Linea (Front Line-PL) leader Paolo Zambianchi, claiming to speak for all PL members, declared that the terrorist group was officially dead. The February 1980 capture of PL military commander Michele Viscardi resulted in a virtual dismantling of the PL in southern Italy and the arrests of many PL members in the north. Most of the PL leadership is now under arrest and many have turned state's evidence or renounced terrorism. We believe PL's ability to perform any terrorist operation has been severely curtailed.

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Iceland: Explosion at US Embassy In Reykjavik, an explosion in front of the US Embassy caused minor damage but no injuries. Initial forensic examination indicates the explosive was a concussion-type grenade. No individual or group has claimed credit for the attack.	
United Kingdom: Letter Bomb Campaign Continues In London, the Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA) claimed responsibility for a letter bomb sent to a Conservative Party meeting at which Prime Minister Thatcher spoke. Army experts defused the firebomb safely. In its confessor letter, the SNLA promised attacks in retaliation for British Government budget cuts in Scottish industry. The Prime Minister has been the target of three bombs within the past month, all of which have been intercepted.	25X1
Greece: Hijacking of Turkish Airliner A lone hijacker, claiming to have a knife and a molotov cocktail, commandeered a Turkish airliner en route from Istanbul to Izmir and forced it to land in Athens. The hijacker claimed to be a member of an unidentified Turkish extremist group and demanded to be flown to Australia. After one unsuccessful attempt, Greek riot police stormed the plane and subdued the hijacker, who offered no resistance. No one was injured in the police action. The hijacker has been identified as a Turkish student and is believed to be mentally unstable. Turkish press reports indicate the hijacker is not a member of any leftist organization, as he claimed.	
Honduras: Terrorists To Coordinate Efforts Four Honduran terrorist groups publicly announced the formation of a Unified Revolutionary Coordinating Board to coordinate the revolutionary struggle in Honduras. Members include the Cinchoneros, the Lorenzo Zelaya, the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers, and the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras.	25X
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Spain: Attack Against Spanish Civil Guard In Sitges, a bomb destroyed a Spanish Civil Guard vehicle but injured no one. No group has yet claimed credit for the attack. The Catalan separatist guerrilla group Terra Lliure (Free Land) has occasionally claimed responsibility for bomb attacks in Catalonia but the group has been inactive for over a year.	
Lebanon: Attack on US Embassy The Islamic Struggle Organization claimed responsibility for the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, which left over 40 dead and 100 injured. The same group has claimed responsibility in the past for the attacks on the multinational	25X1

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Mid-April 1983

18 April 1983

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19 April 1983	
	Spain: Possible GRAPO Resurgence In Valencia, a Spanish national police officer was killed when a bomb attached to his car's ignition system exploded. Although no group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack, the modus operandi strongly indicates that the First of October Antifascist Revolutionary Group (GRAPO) may have been responsible. GRAPO had been inactive since the death of the group's founder and leading strategist, Juan Martin Luna, in a December 1982 gun battle with antiterrorist police. Arrests of other GRAPO members appeared to have disrupted the group's activities. Despite the loss of leadership and members over the past three years,
	GRAPO has continued to reorganize and conduct terrorist operations. Israel: Bomb Threats at US Embassy Two separate telephone bomb threats were received within 15 minutes of each other at the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. Both callers were young males claiming that bombs would be exploding. The Embassy was evacuated and searched both times; both searches came up negative.
21 April 1983	Iraq: Two Car Bombs Explode In the morning two car bombs exploded at different locations in Baghdad. The first occurred in an area across from the Mansour Melia Hotel where cinema studios and FM radio facilities are located. The second explosion was apparently within the compound of the Iraqi Air Force headquarters which includes Air Force intelligence and related offices. No details on the damage or number of casualties are yet available. We believe that Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia dissidents are probably responsible. These Iraqi dissidents claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Iraqi News Agency in Baghdad in December 1982.
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